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According to leading Portuguese criminal justice experts, among the problems 
that ail the Portuguese criminal justice system is the lack of political  involvement and 
accountability after approving laws that criminalize certain acts as one of the causes of 
this system’s dismay (Carvalho 2002). Legislative politics are said to disconnected from 
the criminal justice system. However, this is not a problem that particular to the 
Portuguese justice system. The credibility of the justice systems around the world 
suffers from this problem. This paper deals with this disconnection and how law 
enforcement, court, and prison criminal subsystems deal with this in maintaining 
deterrence strategies—central to criminal justice systems. 
From previous studies (Mendes 2001), I inferred that statutory sentencing and 
prison capacity are not aligned policies.  Setting the maximal severity of the deterrent 
threat is independent of the allocation of criminal justice system resources. Once 
prisons reach and surpass capacity limits and there are no more beds, there is not much 
judges and parole officers can do but turn to options that in one way or another release 
prisoners and reduce the intake, and in this way, relieve the pressure on the system. I 
have elsewhere shown that from the time deterrent policies are adopted, they already 
lack any connection to reality.   The evidence suggests that legislatures, in conformity 
with the literature on its symbolic role in the fight against crime, do not appear to be 
concerned with the end result of the threat they adopt. To the extent that legislatures 
participate in deterrence, they set the “ceilings”—that is, they set the outer limits of 
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deterrent strategies and little else.  One of those limits is the sentencing maxima; 
another is the allocation of available prison resources.   The evidence and the literature 
point to the idea that legislatures are not concerned with the need for the level of 
severity, so the crime rate does not appear to be an ingredient in setting the deterrent 
threat in the legislative arena.  They leave it to the administrative and judicial apparatus 
to give deterrence any real meaning.  Thus, the legislative role in deterrence theory in 
practice is arational; once a legislature adopts a politically correct and electorally safe 
deterrent threat, it disassociates itself from it.    
If there is any rational comprehensiveness to deterrence strategies in practice, 
that rationality must come from somewhere else—the law enforcement, judicial, and 
correctional actors of the criminal justice system.  The legislative delegation of 
authority simultaneously allows politicians to claim credit for doing their part to fight 
crime and it also allows them to blame the criminal justice apparatus for any inefficacy 
in the implementation of the deterrent strategies.    
The consequence of delegating deterrent decisions to the police, the 
prosecutors, the judges, the wardens, and the parole boards is that these actors are really 
the ones that influence the expected cost of punishment.  They design the contours of 
deterrence theory and set it in motion with the necessary discretion to keep things in 
balance.  The discretion they enjoy allows them to employ, manipulate, and/or ignore 
legislative directives or intent.  Thus, despite the determinate sentencing scheme 
introduced in the 70s, these actors are to a great extent left to their own devices, free to 
impose their mark on the expected cost of punishment.   
This freedom is not, however, without its limitations.  Their hands are likely to 
be tied by one very real and unavoidable constraint over which they have no power: 
resource limitation and most especially, the lack of sufficient prison space.   This forces 
the actors to adapt.   From a systems-analysis viewpoint, the criminal justice system 
adjusts the amount of input into the system—criminals—to match to the available 
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resources they have to work with.  The output is the conditional result of the constraints 
on the system.   With so many existing and expected prison beds, judges, wardens, and 
parole boards must exhaust all outlets to house incoming convicted individuals.  But 
there comes a point where deterrence theory in practice is adjusted to existing 
circumstances and contexts.  Deterrence theory is contingent on the context, as with all 
other theories.  The police, prosecutors, judges, and parole officers, have no choice but 
to make adjustments in the certainty and imposed severity of punishment to keep the 
system from collapsing.    
If we were to imagine the extreme situation, this would allow us to see what a 
straightforward application of the deterrent threat adopted by the legislature would 
demand of the criminal justice system.  It would reveal the kinds of decision criminal 
justice actors potentially face and how they have to deal with the limited resources.  Let 
us imagine that every time someone commits a crime he or she is arrested.  Let us also 
imagine that none of these suspects are released by the police and that all are indicted, 
charged, and convicted by way of a trial.  This is already unrealistic because law 
enforcement and the courts lack the money and the personnel to accomplish such tasks.  
But, for the sake of example, let us go on.  Suppose that the type of penalty or sanction 
that all convicted felons receive is a prison sentence—the maximum prison penalty 
allowable by law.  If we were to estimate the expected cost of punishment, this would 
tell us that it could not be.  The cost would be so far out of the bounds of reality that the 
system would break down.  It could not happen simply because there would not be 
enough prison space to house everyone.  Briefly stated, following through with the level 
of statutory harshness is not an option for criminal justice agencies.   
If collapse is not an option, then what is? What do these agencies do? How do 
they handle things when the crime rates rise and criminal intake reaches unrealistic 
levels? The system has not collapsed as of yet and will most likely not collapse because 
there are built in “oxygen vents”, meaning the system is designed to adjust.  Each agent 
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has the power to adjust.  Not all crimes are detected.  The police cannot detect all 
criminal activity and those activities that are detected are not all reported or pursued.  
So not all suspects are arrested and of those who are arrested, many are released for any 
number of reasons.  They are screened out of the system so that, in principle, only the 
most serious and most solid cases are sent to the prosecutor.   The prosecutors are the 
middle men.  They have a great deal of power to keep the system working.  They get to 
select which cases to prosecute, and only a proportion of those are handed over to the 
prosecutors´ offices proceed.   Of those cases that are selected, again only a small 
number of cases are brought before a court.  At least in the U.S.  an overwhelming 
majority of indicted cases are resolved outside the courtroom through plea bargaining.  
Plea bargains are a good example of adjusting tools the system created to lessen the 
pressure the system must face.  Of those individuals who are convicted by way of a plea 
or a trial, only some proportion of them is actually sent to prison.  And finally of those 
that do time in prison, a great deal of them only serves a portion of their prison term.  
Many are released on parole before their sentence is over.  Other´s sentences are 
converted to non-incarceration sanctions.  And, in some countries, for instance Portugal, 
the system created what is referred to as an “amnistia” or a pardon; this is a general or 
partial pardon decree that is issued from time to time and that releases prisoners from 
serving the remaining portions of their sentences.    
This paper is organized as follows.  Following the development of the argument 
and a brief review of the literature on the relationship among the deterrence elements in 
practice, I lay out the preliminary evidence in Western Europe, and, in particular, 
Portugal as to whether and how deterrence theory follows through in practice.  The 
findings are discussed in the final section.   
 
The Theory on the Criminal Justice System in Equilibrium 
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“Sentencing policy is only as mandatory as police, prosecutors, and 
judges choose to make it…Legislators, whatever their purpose for 
supporting mandatory sentencing laws, once the vote is cast move on 
to other issues. For judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel, it is 
another story… [they] must keep the courts functioning. That they 
sometime devise ways to avoid application of laws they believe to be 
uncommonly harsh should come as no surprise.” (Tonry 1992, 267 
italics not in the original) 
 
In the late seventies right about the time when determinate sentencing 
schemes were coming into effect, Daniel Nagin (1978) introduced criminal justice 
scholars to his theory of a long-run incarceration equilibrium. Just as Michael 
Tonry´s words suggest, judges, prosecutors, parole officers, as well as the police do 
not have much of a choice but to use their discretionary powers to keep the system 
under some sort of feasible control.  From the above hypothetical situations, we see 
that managing the incoming suspects and/convicted individuals with the available 
resources is a question of survival. Given the fragmentation of the system and the 
level of discretion that each and every one of the criminal justice actors has, 
adaptation can get out of balance and this of course takes its toll on the deterrent 
threat. With the certainty of punishment and the severity of punishment changing 
constantly due to changes originating from all ends of the criminal justice system so 
to keep the system´s outputs within the bounds, the expected cost of punishment can 
get out of control.  
The core of the Nagin´s thesis is based on the system-capacity model of the 
criminal justice system (Phillips and Votey Jr.1972; Shinnar and Shinnar 1975; 
Green and Allen 1981-2) and the principle of “thermodynamics” (Walker 1985; 
Benekos 1992). The idea is that resources are scarce. They do not increase 
proportionately with increases in the crime rates or the level of legislative severity. 
Because resources are limited, there is a reasonable stability in the level 
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punishment. “…As pressure is experienced at one point of the system (e.g., getting 
tougher on crime with more mandatory and longer minimum sentences) it is 
diffused at some other point in the system (e.g. early release with good time and 
emergency authority to shorten the length of sentence).” (Benekos 1992, 8). 
 Nagin argues that in the long run, the criminal justice system adapts to 
crime rates and the level of harshness of penal sanctions, producing an equilibrium 
in the incarceration rate. In other words, this means that the actors of the criminal 
justice system adjust or modify their behavior within the bounds of their power and 
competency. He uses the following equation to represent his theory of a long-run 
equilibrium: 
 
Incarceration Rate = Crime Rate * Probability of Conviction * Time Served 
in Prison, 
 
where the incarceration rate is the number of individuals imprisoned per some 
number of population, the probability of conviction represents the certainty with 
which punishment will be imposed, and time served represents the severity of that 
punishment. 
Green and Allen (1981-2) speak of an “adaptive function” of the criminal 
justice system to mean just what Nagin is getting at. The system “neutralizes overly-
severe penalties” and sidesteps laws that were not designed to fit reality in many 
ways. In the presence of overly harsh penalties, the police are selective of the 
individuals they feed into the system. Prosecutors are selective of those individuals 
they charge and/or to whom they offer plea bargains.  And finally, to those 
individuals who are committed to prison, judges impose more lenient sentences and 
parole offices offer what authors have labelled as “backdoor”, “sidedoor”, and even 
“trapdoor” solutions. These are opportunities to cut short prison terms by way of 
parole or to at least convert the remaining portions into non-prison sentences (Green 
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and Allen 1981-2; Mullen 1987; Blumstein 1987).  
This notion of equilibrium of the incarceration rate or of an adaptive 
criminal justice system allows us to get at the relationship between the certainty and 
severity of punishment. I can tentatively say that a stable level of punishment 
translates into a stable expected cost of punishment despite attempts made to 
increase severity on the part of legislature. This consequently translates into 
seemingly ineffective deterrent effects. Why? Because it suggests that the certainty 
and the severity of punishment are inversely related. If we algebraically manipulate 
Nagin´s equilibrium function, we uncover this inverse relationship:  
 
Probability of Conviction = Incarceration Rate *         1         *            1        
        Crime Rate      Time Served in 
Prison 
 
or 
 
Time Served in Prison = Incarceration Rate   *                         1        *              1        
       Crime Rate  Probability of Conviction 
 
If the probability of arrest and the severity of punishment are indeed 
inversely related, then this tradeoff makes effective changes in the deterrent threat, 
as seen through the expected cost of punishment, difficult to achieve. Increases in 
statutory penalties are offset by reductions in either imposed penalties or by a lower 
probability of conviction and arrest. Increases in the probability of arrest are offset 
by decreases in either the probability of conviction or the severity of the sentences 
imposed.  
 
The Role of the Courts, Prosecutors, and Correctional Officers 
   
Correctional officers are the first to feel the pressure points of the criminal 
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system. Wardens are those with the least control over the inputs in the system. Yet they 
are the most burdened by any failures on the part of the other actors, legislatures 
included, to devise, implement, and adapt deterrent strategies so as to maintain 
coordination and policies that are feasible and in touch with the available resources. 
When the seams begin to bulge and prison overcrowding infringes upon the 
constitutional rights of the prisoners, those actors that do have some adaptive control 
over the inputs in the system get together to “circumvent” legislative policies (Tonry 
1992, 256; Green and Allen 1981-2; Blumstein 1987; Benekos 1992; Cole and Call 
1992). Policies designed to be “tough” on crime can end up producing the opposite 
effect (Walker 1985).   
According to Donald Gottfredson and Ralph Taylor, writing for the National 
Institute of Justice in 1983, there are four things that can be done about the limitation of 
prison space and avoiding prison overcrowding and prison overcrowding litigation: 1) 
construction of new prison facilities, 2) reduction of prison intake, 3) acceleration of 
release, and 4) tolerance of overcrowding. The first option is not up to the police, 
prisons, and courts. The last option is unconstitutional and has been tested and set right 
in extensive overcrowding litigation that has obligated courts to order states to reduce 
prison overcrowding so as to restore constitutional limits on prison capacity (Blumstein 
1987; Levitt 1996). That leaves the criminal justice system with options numbers two 
and three.  
Although parole boards are the ones with the power over the convicted 
individuals once they are sent to a correctional facility, judges are the primary authority 
when it comes to the level of severity of punishment, for they are the only ones to hand 
down sentences. Judges also have to deal with prison overcrowding problems. They 
cannot dismiss capacity problems when sentencing without the problems coming back 
to them in the form of overcrowding litigation.  Not only are judges faced with the 
dilemma of the overcrowding litigation, where they often have to rule in favor of the 
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plaintiff, that is, the convicted prisoner (Benekos 1992; Cole and Call 1992; Levitt 
1996), they have to impose sentences will lesser future litigation and relieve the 
pressure placed on the parole officers to release prisoners. In doing so, they have to take 
into account what resources they have to work with and the incoming flow of prisoners 
and balance these with the deterrent threat of the sentence. Just sentences for those who 
have been convicted and effective sentences for those who need to be deterred are 
sacrificed in the name of efficiency (Waldfogel 1993). When resources are low and/or 
the rate of conviction is high, judges and juries have no choice but to impose sentences 
that are a fraction of the maximum sentences that legislatures set. In this way they 
exercise a “front-door” solution to the problem of overcrowding (Logan 1972; Bullock 
1961; Tittle 1969; Green and Allen 1981-2; Andreoni 1991; Louthan 1985; Green and 
Allen 1981-2; Tonry 1992; Cole and Call 1992; Tullock 1995).   
Another option that judges have employed to sidestep increased certainty of 
punishment and limited prison capacity is the “sidedoor” solution (Gottfredson 1987; 
Blumstein 1987; 1988). This consists in judges converting already imposed sentences 
into non-prison sentences, so as to create new space. Prisoners can serve the remaining 
portion of their sentence under house arrest, performing community service, paying a 
fine, etc. And finally, there is the “trapdoor” solution, a term that Donald Gottfredson 
(1987) coined. This consists of the adoption of “emergency release laws” that act as 
“safety valves” and come into effect in extreme situations. 
Resources and the probability of conviction aside, judges are said to employ a 
psychological discounting function where they account for the declining marginal 
disutility of the prisoners´ imprisonment experience (Fitzmaurice and Pease 1986; 
Ostrom and Ostrom 1999). Each additional year in prison has less deterrent effect 
because the prisoner´s value in terms of legal income earning capacity decreases, which 
only contributes to the probability of recidivism, and because prisoners themselves do 
some adapting. They become accustomed to prison life to the extent that one more year 
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will not make much of a difference when discounted to the present. Since resources 
constraints and the probability of conviction cannot be ignored, the consequence of the 
judges’ balancing act is an even higher judicial discount rate, which results in a lower 
level of severity of punishment than that announced by the legislatures.  
Then there is the figure of the prosecutor. Prosecutors have the “single most 
unreviewed exercise of power in the criminal justice system” (Gottfredson and 
Gottfredson 1980, 146). They decide which cases filed by the police. When the 
legislature tightens its control over the courts, prosecutorial power increases. The 
discretion judges lose is shifted to the prosecutors so that the game is still on this side of 
the court. Even juries tend to deliver fewer guilty verdicts when the severity is very high 
and the hands of the judges are tied as to the minimum mandatory required sentence in 
the face of a guilty verdict (Andreoni 1991).  Penalties and the probability of conviction 
are interdependent.  
 
A Look at the Evidence 
 
If we take a given criminal justice system at any given moment and examine the 
deterrence components what do you find? What can a static observation of the world 
tell us about how criminal justice agencies and subsystems carry out the deterrent threat 
once the legislatures set the initial deterrent threat in the statutes they adopt? They can 
tell us plenty. Above Nagin (1978), Green and Allen (1981-82), and Tsebelis (1989; 
1990; 1991; 1993; 1995), and others tell us implicitly assume that the criminal justice is 
about being equilibrium. Equilibrium, in turn, implies that some thing or phenomenon 
that is in equilibrium might not always be in equilibrium. In other words, and for the 
purpose of my study here, the criminal justice system stretches, contracts, etc.. Its 
subsystems act and react to the shocks to the systems, shocks constituting changes 
brought about by the legislatures on the one hand, and by all the other bureaucratic and 
judicial agencies on the other. This gives us a notion that these agencies are responsive 
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to one another. They have to be to secure some sort of balance in the criminal justice 
system and keep it from collapsing. 
 An ideal criminal justice system would have the capacity to house all arrested 
individuals convicted to the maximum penalty allowable by law. But in reality nothing 
is ideal, nor is “ideal” ever the objective, as any economist would tell us. Not as long as 
there are resource constraints. And governments are never without them. This means 
public policies are not meant to solve all public problems and the goal is never zero 
pollution, zero health problems, etc. or, in this case, zero crime and total justice, 
meaning every one who commits a crime is arrested for it, convicted and sent to prison 
for as long as the law permits. 
So this being the case, I can examine how the elements under the control of the 
agencies that implement and effectively set the deterrent threat vary across jurisdictions, 
namely: 
1) Given that we know tradeoffs must and do occur to keep the system in balance?  
How can we detect them?  
2) How do different jurisdictions “trade things off” as they are faced with their 
resource constraints? What balancing acts are done, and on whose part?  
 
One gains confidence in arriving at an answer for these major questions by 
looking at what the worldly evidence across jurisdictions for any given year has to 
offer. In this section, I attempt to do just that by providing a series of tables, graphs, and 
scatterplots of Western European criminal justice systems, with particular focus on the 
Portuguese system. In the case of Western Europe, I have two sets of data: 1995 data 
from the European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics of the Council 
of Europe; and 1994 data from the United Nations World Surveys on Crime Trends and 
Criminal Justice Systems. In the Appendix to this chapter, I provide 1994 UN data on 
specific major crimes for those interested.  
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Finally in Portugal, I have a time dimension with data reaching back to 1960 
and as recent as 1997. These data are from the Portuguese Research and Planning 
Office of the Ministry of Justice—the Gabinete de Estudos e Planeamento do 
Ministério e Justiça (GEPMJ). 
 
Western Europe 
 
 Tables 1 includes data on total offense rate (offenses/100,000 persons), the 
number or arrests, the number of convictions, statutory and imposed sentence lengths in 
years, prison population, and prison capacity. Figure 1 is the graphic depiction of much 
of what we see listed in Table 1: the total offense rate, the number of arrests, the 
number convictions, prison capacity, and the prison population in 17 Western European 
nations. Several Appendix Tables 1-6 covering 19 UN nations for specific major crime 
types in 1994) are provided for those interested in specific crime types. The purpose of 
Figure 1 is to illustrate the discrepancies between the offense rate, deterrent elements of 
arrests and convictions, and prison data and to pinpoint some indications of “balancing 
acts” or tradeoffs within nations. As is plain to visualize, the number of arrests 
constitutes a small proportion of total reported offenses; the number of convictions is, in 
turn, a smaller fraction of the number of arrests. Even so, the number of convictions is 
overwhelming compared to the space available to put these convicted individuals, 
provided they are convicted to some type of prison confinement. Most obvious to reader 
is the lack of or very near capacity of the prison systems in these countries. Switzerland, 
for instance, a nation with an offense rate in the same ball park as that of, say, Finland, 
arrests and convicts fewer times than Finland. But compare the prison population and 
capacity figures. Finland has more room to house incoming convicted felons. Compare 
a Southern European nation, such as Portugal with, say, Ireland. Portugal has a 
somewhat similar arrest figure to that of Ireland; but notice that since Portugal, contrary 
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to Ireland, was already operating above capacity in 1995, it is plausible to expect that 
Portugal convicted a lot fewer than Ireland, less than half the number of times.  
It is evident from Figure 2 shows that the prison population tracks and many 
times exceeds the capacity for that population in every nation under observation for 
which I have inmate and capacity data. The few exceptions, Austria, Denmark Finland, 
Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, and Ireland, are a small ways away from reaching the 
limit, after which tradeoffs are most likely to occur with greater consequences. 
[Table 1 about here] 
[Figures 1-2 about here] 
Table 2 compares statutory and imposed severity for six Western European 
nations and for four different offenses (those Western European nations for which 
imposed sentence data is available). This table shows that, again, judicially-imposed 
sentences are a very small fraction of the statutory maxima. England Wales are among 
the harshest Western European nations when it comes to statutory severity and that 
Sweden is among the most lenient. Table 2 tells us, in the case of murder, for instance, 
these two nations are on opposite ends of the statutory severity scale, but they have very 
similar levels of imposed severity. In the case of theft, England and Wales impose a 
mere .02% of the statutory maxima, 40 years, for an average imposed sentence length of 
almost 10 months. In Sweden, the actual average imposed sentence length is not much 
different from that of the English and Welsh imposed sentence despite the statutory 
maximum penalty of six years in penalty.   
 [Table 2 about here] 
[Appendix Tables 1-6 about here] 
Portugal 
 
 In Portugal, the evidence is indicative that criminal justice agencies, just as in 
Western Europe, respond to the pressures of resource constriction that is evident on 
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Figures 3 and 4.  Figure 3 displays, the number of individuals charged with a crime, the 
number of persons convicted, the number of persons serving time in prison, the number 
of persons incarcerated, and finally, the prison capacity from 1960 to 1994.i To note is 
companion table, Table 3, which provides the numbers that serve as the basis of this 
graph. This number of persons charged with a crime and convicted and well as those 
sentenced to prison began to decrease.  This downward trend is also apparent when we 
look at the evolution of the Portuguese prison system.  From 1960 to 1972/74, prison 
occupation was well below capacity.  The number of prisons decreased dramatically as 
Portugal made its transition to a democratic regime in 1974. This number went from 
207 in 1960 to 112 in 1972 and dropped even further to 79 by 1974 and stabilized 
around 36 by 1978.  
Things start gradually to pick up as the democratic regime progresses. By this, 
the number of persons charged with a crime, as well as the number of persons convicted 
to a given sanction, gradually increases, particularly in the mid 1980s. Notice, however, 
that the correctional subsystem never quite accompanies the growth in law enforcement, 
prosecution, and court loads. This indicates that resources capped at a given point and 
the prison system did not and could not grow to match the growth in crime. This is 
when the pressure on a criminal justice system with 40-some prisons begins to build 
and by the mid 1980s prison capacity is very near the limit. In fact in 1985 prison 
capacity was already at 114%. By the early to mid 1990s, the prison constraints reached 
an all-time high. Interesting to note in Portugal is the role of the “amnistia” or a 
governmental pardon.  When the pressure did begin to mount by the middle of the 
1980s, the Portuguese legislative bodiesii created a legislative act designed to relieve 
pressure on the prison system. Eight pardons were approved from 1981 to 1994. 
Figure 3 vividly depicts the mounting stress on the Portuguese criminal justice 
system beginning especially in the mid 80s and growing dimmer with each passing year 
thereafter. Figure 4 concentrates on the latter portion of Figure 3. Comparing Figure 4 
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with last two columns of Table 4, as well as the last two columns of Table 3, we can 
more easily visualize the physical bound that the Portugal legislative bodies imposed on 
Portuguese law enforcement and the wider judicial apparatus.  
[Tables 3 and 4 about here] 
[Figures 3 and 4 about here] 
Even though the Portuguese criminal justice system experienced this pressure, 
it did not collapse. The number of convictions kept growing and so did the number of 
individuals sentenced to prison at least until 1993. So what happened? Tradeoffs. From 
1993 to 1997, the number of convicted individuals began to drop, despite an increase in 
offenses, and in the number of persons charged (for those interested in more detailed 
and disaggregated data for each districts in Continental Portugal, refer to Appendix 
Tables 7 and 8). To be exact, convictions dropped 9% and the number of person serving 
time 11% from 1993 to 94 alone.  
[Appendix Tables 7-8] 
Figure 5 shows that in 1997, the number of arrests represented a mere 7% of 
total offenses recorded by the three major police forces  (the Polícia Judiciária, the 
Polícia de Segurança Pública, and the Guarda Nacional); and the number of 
convictions represented only 1% of total offenses and 16% of all arrests.  Figure 6 
merely breaks these aggregate numbers among the Continental Portuguese districts. As 
shown in Figure 7, with the exception of one district, Bragança, the prison population 
exceeded the prison capacity in every district in Continental Portugal, the most severe 
of these districts being Évora, Faro, Lisboa, Porto, and Setúbal. These are indications of 
the system operating within its bounds, conforming and adjusting to them.  
[Figures 5-7 about here] 
With all of these legislative and resource restrictions, there must occur tradeoffs 
among the agencies. Figure 8 (for total offenses) shows three scatterplots with the 
respective regressional equations: 1) relationship between the probability of arrest and 
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the probability of conviction; 2) average maximum imposed sentence and the 
probability of arrest, and 3) the average maximum imposed sentence and the probability 
of conviction.  These plots appear to indicate tradeoffs between deterrence elements.  
The relationship appears to negative between the probability of arrest and the 
probability of conviction—a clear indication of these deterrent elements responding to 
one another. It also appears to be negative between the average imposed sentence 
severity and each of the certainty deterrent elements, however the latter two 
relationships are not statistically significant as the regression coefficients below the 
plots indicate.  
[Figure 8 about here] 
 
Conclusion 
 
Having examined and discussed the tradeoffs that occur among criminal justice 
agencies within Western European criminal justice systems,  we can see in this paper 
that, as Nagin and others argue, these systems manage to survive under the conditions 
that the level of statutory harshness and the level of prison resources available to them 
impose on them.  How? By the agencies making use of the built-in flexibility that 
allows for interactive manuevering and adjustments on the part of the administrative 
and judicial apparatus. Criminal justice systems do not collapse. They do not 
continuously expand as the level statutory penal harshness does and would require. 
Critics are quick to point out that the system has grown out of control. The legislatures 
do not allow for that; and really an economic outlook on the subject of crime would 
never claim that the objective of criminal justice systems is a zero crime rate because of 
something called budget restrictions. Justice systems do not grow indefinitely, but as I 
have observed and compared elements of deterrence across jurisdictions above, they do 
bend and stretch a good deal as a result of the adjustments made on the part of those 
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whom the legislatures intended:  the police who control the probability of arrest and 
detection; the prosecutors who greatly influence the probability of conviction; the 
judges who decide the actual punishment within very broad limits; and the parole 
boards who have the last say about the time served in prison for those individuals who 
were convicted and sentenced to incarceration.  
Every one of these actors holds the power over one or more components that 
comprise deterrence theory. If statutory severity rises with no adequate or rationally 
associated increase in the prison capacity, the expected cost of punishment will not 
necessarily increase.  What does this mean in practice? It means that we would see the 
probability of arrest, the probability of conviction, the length of court-imposed 
sentences, as well as the effective length of time served in prison fluctuate with the 
intention of keeping the system in balance. Campaign slogans promising tougher 
penalties and consequently the adoption of stiffer statutory penalties does not mean a 
greater deterrent effect. The initial deterrent threat may rise, but as I have discussed, 
that threat is altered as the criminal justice subsystems find ways to counteract the 
pressures that the increases in deterrent harshness places on them. 
 I investigated how the police, the courts (in particular) and correctional 
subsystem, as a fragmented system, operationalize deterrent theory. The evidence 
shows that prison capacity is extremely limited compared to the input that the criminal 
justice systems receive. The police, prosecutors, judges, and parole officers, due to 
unavoidable resource constraints especially prison capacity, make adjustments in the 
certainty of punishment and the imposed severity of punishment to keep the system 
from becoming extinct. The survival of the criminal justice system implies that the 
certainty and severity of punishment play off one another. In other words, the certainty 
of punishment responds to the severity of punishment and vice-versa, and both respond 
to the availability of prison space. 
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Table 1: Offenses, Arrests, Convictions, and Prison Data for Western Europe, 1995 
Countries Offenses Arrests Convictions Prison Pop Prison Capacity 
Austria 3674.4 820 323.4 76 95 
Belgium 5697.2   76 64 
Denmark 10699.3  865.4 66 73 
Finland 5975.9 1777 790.3 59 80 
France 4949.7 636  89 84 
Germany 5577.4 1501 330.6 81 87 
Greece 1628.9 232 66.2  41 
Ireland 2666.6 1256 376.8 59 62 
Italy 2819.7 285 70 87 71 
Luxembourg 1686 565  115 11 
Netherlands 9053.4 1180 242.9  76 
Norway 6368.7 336 209.7 56 63 
Portugal 2410.4* 1006** 128.7 106 91 
Spain  162** 114.6 102 78 
Sweden 10017.6 630 488.9 66 70 
Switzerland 4920.5 702 98 81 85 
England & Wales 10062.6* 807 381.1 99 98 
 
Note: Figures are per 100,000 persons. 
Source: European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics of the Council of Europe. 
 
*Portuguese and English and Welsh figures does not include murder offenses. 
** Portuguese figure does not include arrests for murder; Spanish figure does not include arrests for murder and theft.
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Table 2: Statutory and Imposed Sentence Severity in Western Europe, 1995 
 
 
 Murder Rape Robbery Theft  
Countries    Statutory   Imposed  Statutory Imposed Statutory Imposed Statutory Imposed 
France 40 10.7 20 9.2 20 1.8 10 0.5 
Norway 40 9.2 40 2.8 12 2.3 6 1.7 
Portugal 25 9.6 10 5.9 18 4.6 8 2.4 
Sweden 40 6.3 10 2.5 10 1.9 6 0.4 
Switzerland 40 8.2 20 3.7 20 2.3 10 0.4 
England & Wales 40 5.7 40 6.5 12 3.2 40 0.8 
 
Note: Figures are in years. 
Source:  European Sourcebook for Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics 1999-2000; Library of Congress, Washington D.C. and interviews with legal specialists in foreign law of the Law Library of Congress 
(January 2000). 
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Table 3: Criminal Justice Data for Portugal, 1960-94 
 
Nº Charged Nº Convicted %Convicted 
Total Prison 
Pop 
Prison Pop 
 Await. Trial 
Serving Time 
in Prison 
% Prison Pop  
Convicted Nº Prisons 
Prison  
Capacity 
%Prison 
Occupation 
1960 38245 22398 59 8418 807 7611 90 207 10878 77 
1962 37760 22390 59 8933 1140 7793 87 213 10823 83 
1964 35633 22264 62 8532 1163 7369 86 213 10823 79 
1966 33815 20722 61 7411 911 6500 88 215 10857 68 
1968 29988 17788 59 6298 723 5575 89 215 11032 57 
1970 19918 14570 73 5056 571 4485 89 215 10705 47 
1972 25781 13998 54 3405 509 2896 85 112 8978 38 
1974 18135 9788 54 2132 985 1147 54 79 7749 28 
1976 30165 13175 44 3633 1360 2273 63 50 7449 49 
1978 30924 15866 51 4709 1541 3168 67 36 7138 66 
1980 29612 14227 48 5352 1583 3769 70 36 7138 75 
1981* 39298 11684 30 5402 1544 3858 71 36 7138 76 
1982* 37410 12510 33 4957 1544 3413 69 36 7138 69 
1983 35563 13700 39 6391 2724 3667 57 36 7150 89 
1984 38981 15801 41 7993 3161 4832 60 36 8236 97 
1985* 49970 19237 38 9150 3520 5630 62 36 8004 114 
1986* 61489 17935 29 7936 3586 4350 55 38 7334 108 
1987 54215 19346 36 7965 3169 4796 60 39 7334 109 
1988 53941 20189 37 7960 2583 5377 68 39 7321 109 
1989 54474 21650 40 8358 2625 5733 69 39 7321 114 
1990* 56192 21833 39 8874 2507 6367 72 41 7386 120 
1991* 71687 22833 32 7877 2993 4884 62 40 7267 108 
1992 82972 22863 28 9451 3465 5986 63 40 7267 130 
1993 74274 30351 41 11062 3850 7212 65 47 7267 152 
1994* 95107 37442 39 10120 3632 6488 64 48 7897 128 
 
Source: Barreto 1995* These are years during which laws issuing pardons (“amnistias”) were passed. Three pardons (one general and two partial) in 1981; one general pardon in 1982; one partial pardon in 1985; one partial pardon in 1990; one 
general pardon in 1991; and one general pardon (except for offenses related to European fund fraud) in 1994.  
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Table 4: Offenses, Arrests, Convictions, Sentence and Prison Data for Continental Portugal, 1993-97 
 
 
Year Offenses Arrests Convictions Sent. Length Prison Pop Prison Cap.
1993 330905 27834 5812 31.22 7668* 6318 
1994 368331 26331 5190 35.43 8837 6657 
1995 362723 25445 5835 36.48 10504 7246 
1996 335223 23971 4604 35.31 12077 7646 
1997 340071 23716 3888 38.25 12418 9148 
 
Source: GEPMJ 
 
Notes: Convictions refers to individuals sentenced to unsuspended prison incarceration. Prison population includes individuals awaiting trial. Prison capacity refers to 
beds in central and regional prison facilities but excludes beds in three special prison facilities.  
 
*1993 prison data refers to 1992 prison data. 
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Appendix Table 1:  Criminal Justice Data for Western Democracies, Total Offenses, 1994 
 
Nations Offenses Suspects Prosecutions
Court 
Acquittals 
Brought to 
Trial Convictions
Sentenced to 
Prison 
Adult Pris. 
Beds 
Adult 
Prisons 
Juv. Pris. 
Beds Juv. Prisons
Prison 
Adm.
Adults 
Adm.
Convict. 
Adm. 
Convict.  
Adult Adm. 
AUSTRALIA     1545400 14762 16643 104     23774
AUSTRIA 504568 201757 15744 85229 69485 4827 8000 47 200 2 17421 5064 4979
BELGIUM 577902     3686 6002 31  17082 16464 3266 3764
CANADA 2919557 702425 152431 6221 152431 180607 28318 34984 221  4758   
DENMARK 546928 147094 164794 1513 30968 27471 2584 3756 57  15071 14871 2584 2584
FINLAND 389287 211791 88870 3410 88870 85460 2642 3606 23 176 1 8711 2642 2506
FRANCE 3919008 775120             
GERMANY   637531 24667 936459 501386         
GREECE 303311 273840   83818 3737 25 350 2 5157 4581 3985 3775
ITALY 2173448 744892 601369 59368 265999 206631 25630 360 23 100829 99386 25630 25336
JAPAN 1863390 376988 1173806 181 60286 58889 37482 59466 184 5105 8 21266 37482 37450
LUXEMBOURG 21067   3315 303 1 1  304 303
NETHERLANDS   236352 3115 95990 81570 4980 543 263     
PORTUGAL   95107 60623 95107 34484 6403 7897 48 273 1 7885 7339 6403 6152
SPAIN 692915 229664             
SWEDEN 1112505 101892 197114  152996 5150 5132 78  14198 14164 5150 5140
SWITZERLAND 357794    82050 6159 172  10180 10180 4435
ENGLAND & 
WALES 5249478 1928806 63770 1928806 320448 35226 41177 108 7772 26 61188 118677 35226 30024
USA 13989500 14648700       57542 1076 541434 541434  
N. IRELAND 67886 10675 1543 10675 8345 1429 1953 4 300 1 1375 1349 1429 1420
SCOTLAND 527064 62432 3643 62182 51261 4419 4761 17 874 4 12709 16752 4505 3785
Mean 2071506.35 1674014.82 445773.92 20316.50 382979.79 129660.07 11856.07 13587.73 92.50 7285.50 104.09 55950.93 76836.09 10282.31 10361.80
Standard Deviation 3406356.23 4310398.35 575854.65 25668.41 624381.35 131277.74 13034.37 17439.14 97.89 17851.09 322.47 136809.10 159161.78 13178.36 12151.11
Minimum 21067 101892 10675 181 3315 8345 303 543 1 176 1 1375 1349 304 303
Maximum 13989500 14648700 1928806 63770 1928806 501386 37482 59466 360 57542 1076 541434 541434 37482 37450
  
  
Source: UN World Surveys on Crime Trends and Criminal Justice Systems, 1970-1994 (ICPSR #2513)  
Note: Sentence is in months. 
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Appendix Table 2:  Criminal Justice Data for Western Democracies, Murder Offenses, 1994 
 
Mean 807.07 330.43 812.20 446.67 29105.23 356.50 232.71 101 392 67
Standard Deviation 819.75 406.31 733.95 419.93 102411.46 409.67 220.20 63.64 614.57 64.37
Minimum 161 75 183 73 96 53 30 56 26 24
Maximum 2696 1406 2075 1108 369941 1299 745 146 1601 141
 
Source: UN World Surveys on Crime Trends and Criminal Justice Systems, 1970-1994 (ICPSR #2513) 
Note: Sentence is in months. 
Nations Murders
Completed 
Murders Suspects
Completed 
Murder Suspects Prosecutions
Completed Murder 
Prosecutions Convictions
Aver. Sent. 
Served Prison Adm.
Completed Murder
Prison Adm.
AUSTRALIA 641 296     146  
AUSTRIA 197 88 183   67   
BELGIUM 315 120    146   
CANADA 547 439 119 30   
DENMARK 255 75 235 73 272 101 51 33 24
FINLAND 2696 1406 2075 1108      
FRANCE     327 234 282   
GERMANY 264 133 278   51 175 141
GREECE 2691 969 2044 577 2364 1299 581 1601 
ITALY 1279 695 1275 696 713 567 460 
JAPAN           
LUXEMBOURG     2412 745   
NETHERLANDS     539 289 383   
PORTUGAL 837 159 289 75 294 79 1   
SPAIN     927 527 260   
SWEDEN       297   
SWITZERLAND 338 83  96 60 36   
USA 732 109  145 53 86 57 36
ENGLAND & WALES 512 147 505 151 219 123 215   
N. IRELAND 641 266 799 369941 8    
SCOTLAND 161 80    59 56 26 
     
 26 
 
Appendix Table 3:  Criminal Justice Data for Western Democracies, Manslaughter Offenses, 1994 
Mean 124.67 198.71 576.64 439.47 44.00 34.40
Standard Deviation 155.44 239.60 1312.60 1045.66 46.67 43.41
Minimum 3 7 14 15 11 0
Maximum 467 597 4446 4172 77 110
Nations Manslaughters Suspects Prosecutions Convictions Aver. Sent. Served Prison Adm.
AUSTRALIA 234   77 
AUSTRIA 86 93 219  
BELGIUM 28  337  
CANADA 49 52 121 41  
DENMARK 8 7 14  0
FINLAND 21     
FRANCE       
GERMANY   962 636  
GREECE 34 38 145 22
ITALY 349 488 4446 4172 110
JAPAN 467 597 235 237  
LUXEMBOURG       
NETHERLANDS   15 15  
PORTUGAL   327 138  
SPAIN       
SWEDEN 213 116 113 76  
SWITZERLAND    257 11 14
USA    19  
ENGLAND & WALES   50 247  
NORTHERN IRELAND 3 21 18  
SCOTLAND 4 39 35 26
Source: UN World Surveys on Crime Trends and Criminal Justice Systems, 1970-1994 (ICPSR # 2513)     Note: Sentence is in months.   
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Appendix Table 4:  Criminal Justice Data for Western Democracies, Rape Offenses, 1994 
 
Nations Rapes Suspects  Prosecutions Convictions Aver. Sent. Served
AUSTRALIA 14027   44
AUSTRIA 553 400 400  
BELGIUM 899    
CANADA 31690 12533 12533 118 
DENMARK 481 291 291 272 
FINLAND 387 248 248 71 
FRANCE 6526 4810 4810  
GERMANY    1415 
GREECE 258 191 191  
ITALY 869 885 885 1294 
JAPAN 1616 1161 1161 792 
LUXEMBOURG      
NETHERLANDS    1009 
PORTUGAL    218 
SPAIN 1211 828 828 1319 
SWEDEN 1812 277 277 30
SWITZERLAND 275   30
USA 102220 36610 36610  
ENGLAND & WALES 5067  1782 
N.  IRELAND 208  45 
SCOTLAND 569  91 
Mean 9921.65 5294 5294 702.17 34.67
Standard Deviation 25068.48 11024.74 11024.74 637.58 8.08
Minimum 208 191 191 45 30
Maximum 102220 36610 36610 1782 44
    
Source: UN World Surveys on Crime Trends and Criminal Justice Systems, 1970-1994 (ICPSR #2513)  Note: Sentence is in months. 
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Appendix Table 5:  Criminal Justice Data for Western Democracies, Robbery Offenses, 1994 
 
 
Nations Robberies Suspects Prosecutions Convictions Aver. Sent Served Prison Adm.
AUSTRALIA 14370   56 
AUSTRIA 2442 400 595  
BELGIUM 1448  2312 413
CANADA 28888 12533 1495 1985 1000
DENMARK 4880 291 1074 515 390
FINLAND 2122 248 547 505  
FRANCE 73310 4810    
GERMANY   9765 7592  
GREECE 812 191
 
 78 117
ITALY 29981 885 9833 5871 7987
JAPAN 2684 1161 1122 821 650
LUXEMBOURG       
NETHERLANDS   5569 3123  
PORTUGAL   1584 1294  
SPAIN 55678 828 103765   
SWEDEN 5331 277 546 23 365
SWITZERLAND 1954  417 25 139
USA 618950 36610 1824 56 
ENGLAND & WALES 59765 9303 4902 2801
N. IRELAND 1567 303 168  
SCOTLAND 5297 961 710 414
Mean 53498.76 5294 12110.08 1956.35 40 1427.60
Standard Deviation 147592.39 11024.74 29116.38 2203.28 18.49 2434.48
Minimum 812 191 303 78 23 117
Maximum 618950 36610 103765 7592 56 7987
  
 
Source: UN World Surveys on Crime Trends and Criminal Justice Systems, 1970-1994 (ICPSR #2513) 
Note: Sentence is in months. 
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Appendix Table 6:  Criminal Justice Data for Western Democracies, Theft and Burglary Offenses, 1994 
 
 
Nations Thefts Burglaries Theft Suspects
Burglary 
Suspects
Theft 
Prosecutions 
Burglary 
Prosecutions
Theft 
Convictions 
Burglary 
Convictions 
Theft Sent. 
Served 
Burglary Sent. 
Served 
Theft     
Prison Adm
Burglary 
Prison Adm 
AUSTRALIA         14 26  
AUSTRIA 127076 90162 20734 8275  12305 2428    
BELGIUM 275484 154659    6138 5095  2529 3601
CANADA 1003322 387877 124310 50218 14833 7740 26179 14960   406
DENMARK 206278 106338 48182 10982 51911 8533 23069 3637  3387 1663
FINLAND 115234 98656  36680 36086     
FRANCE 2573074 484901 293350 55272        
GERMANY     172771 38450 140590 30863    
GREECE 57343 37123 8455 4768  2359   1419 
ITALY 1333089 110177 62003 1499 32254 422  23408 176
JAPAN 1310077 247661 146745 18168 1790 14084   6222 189
LUXEMBOURG             
NETHERLANDS     88140 25644 16  
PORTUGAL     14827 7594     
SPAIN 72313 140723 10282 24804 495211      
SWEDEN 506642 141278 28912 6650 35187 12407 32443 8 2102 
SWITZERLAND 195409 66466    8094 8 1477 
USA 9419100 2712800 1714700 396100  3126 136 11 24  
ENGLAND & WALES 2501778 1257916  142825 59217 101756 37952  12453 10441
N. IRELAND 33233 16902  3687 1212 3044 979  187 188
SCOTLAND 238233 88394  25561 6051 21255 4921  5999 2236
Mean 7980.31 402123.73 250584.70 63915.22 58947.73 63211 29177.65 10139.30 11.40 25 5918.30 2362.50
Standard Deviation 3651.93 710620.67 521878.44 125949.89 54793.95 152968 370.29 13577.27 3.58 1.41 7102.16 3492.08
Minimum 33233. 16902 8455 4768 3687 1212. 2359 136 8 24 187 176
Maximum 94191. 27128 17147 3961 172771 495211 140590 37952 16 26 23408 10441
 
Source: UN World Surveys on Crime Trends and Criminal Justice Systems, 1970-1994 (ICPSR #2513)    Note: Sentence is in months 
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Appendix Table 7:  Criminal Justice Data for Districts in Continental Portugal, 1993-97 
 
  Crimes   Arrests  Convictions   
Average Length 
of Imposed Sentences (months) 
Prison 
Data*  
Districts Year Person Property Society State Person Property Society State Person Property Society State Person Property Society State Prispop Priscap 
Aveiro  1993 4403 9506 1761 123 103 300 950 91 52 210 41 16 28 35 40 8 83 43
Aveiro  1994 4483 10564 1836 483 117 303 829 101 33 165 38 29 44 35 44 27 75 43
Aveiro  1995 4472 10329 2276 175 79 323 904 123 28 167 23 7 55 34 41 9 106 43
Aveiro  1996 4542 10066 2309 116 80 279 1101 77 51 130 14 7 57 31 13 9 111 43
Aveiro  1997 4779 10294 2114 152 50 264 1123 96 31 114 25 11 50 33 35 11 79 43
Beja 1993 700 1130 719 40 57 113 486 23 19 66 9 3 49 26 20 6 72 48
Beja 1994 645 1325 815 44 20 87 424 28 11 59 3 2 45 33 27 18 79 48
Beja 1995 722 1299 939 43 27 82 525 28 8 47 2 2 25 22 49 18 217 166
Beja 1996 694 1153 794 51 24 72 474 31 22 35 4 3 38 18 17 37 255 166
Beja 1997 726 1070 763 34 12 49 418 16 12 36 2 1 51 31 6 1 256 104
Braga 1993 4559 9933 2089 96 76 399 1029 92 69 200 45 15 49 29 23 5 247 179
Braga 1994 4677 10795 1981 96 57 400 871 59 55 158 40 8 54 33 34 13 247 179
Braga 1995 5131 10532 2480 116 58 384 907 75 45 186 55 12 43 29 47 9 323 179
Braga 1996 5359 10338 2255 104 42 268 871 69 37 175 20 10 55 32 31 36 306 179
Braga 1997 5468 10096 2096 87 60 252 1046 64 27 184 21 7 102 29 31 21 311 120
Bragança  1993 872 1570 339 21 20 29 144 15 14 20 5 4 50 35 35 45 36 59
Bragança  1994 881 1719 672 18 35 41 201 11 20 19 3 1 82 38 5 29 75 59
Bragança  1995 999 1913 584 20 12 45 161 18 17 32 6 1 64 32 40 10 101 59
Bragança  1996 924 1765 626 16 18 50 871 69 28 46 6 2 86 28 20 8 232 359
Bragança  1997 1085 1652 551 18 21 26 1046 64 14 13 4 2 120 32 20 20 359 364
C. Branco  1993 884 1631 563 47 14 66 260 34 14 31 8 3 68 25 21 2 113 150
C. Branco  1994 909 1614 663 49 18 51 281 30 15 36 10 3 88 29 29 10 139 150
C. Branco  1995 958 1881 809 42 18 67 369 29 14 28 4 1 92 38 40 41 190 150
C. Branco  1996 1018 1728 659 16 25 41 207 6 13 22 4 3 73 33 5 25 317 150
C. Branco  1997 1072 1903 663 49 26 53 279 12 18 30 5 6 65 43 56 6 377 223
Coimbra 1993 2617 6631 1145 82 49 164 386 62 46 128 38 7 52 25 23 7 531 387
Coimbra 1994 2746 7146 1518 114 35 197 353 63 19 93 15 8 59 31 45 15 511 387
Coimbra 1995 3181 7555 2123 105 17 145 398 66 32 121 34 13 21 26 32 9 591 387
 31 
Coimbra 1996 3296 7085 1489 75 22 137 342 39 21 129 32 34 35 23 631 387
Coimbra 1997 3325 6493 1411 81 30 67 374 35 15 80 29 11 90 37 32 10 684 668
Évora 1993 1017 1749 546 68 17 66 373 23 18 35 2 4 99 32 11 25 52 40
Évora 1994 1054 2069 550 58 25 55 360 26 11 61 7 5 34 28 62 14 60 40
Évora 1995 1082 2270 652 25 13 86 311 19 21 63 7 4 38 32 42 25 61 40
Évora 1996 1168 2167 586 23 20 98 442 12 7 55 2 4 33 29 39 29 82 40
Évora 1997 1038 2075 397 44 24 91 372 27 12 55 2 33 43 31 109 46
Faro 1993 2717 13769 1562 125 118 516 866 95 68 227 26 9 68 32 26 13 296 116
Faro 1994 2880 14948 1860 144 67 604 1049 78 69 273 34 8 62 34 35 14 333 125
Faro 1995 3182 14429 2167 119 70 500 1277 72 37 226 21 9 51 37 34 21 377 125
Faro 1996 3390 15393 2104 122 59 368 1511 61 55 240 12 6 58 33 18 29 477 225
Faro 1997 3957 14984 2123 165 54 320 1396 110 20 169 14 7 51 40 18 12 490 246
Guarda  1993 776 1382 437 24 22 84 191 15 18 57 13 2 82 31 43 43 80 84
Guarda  1994 810 1501 764 26 40 67 210 12 28 22 13 3 90 35 23 17 147 84
Guarda  1995 810 1431 631 43 18 51 203 24 15 30 1 2 79 28 30 70 194 84
Guarda  1996 750 1219 653 38 9 68 237 26 11 19 3 62 36 32 20 175 84
Guarda  1997 906 1403 550 45 48 293 17 10 12 2 74 24 35 205 162
Leiria 1993 2307 7206 1367 60 50 268 611 34 34 89 25 6 43 26 40 4 286 142
Leiria 1994 2536 8115 1675 66 36 275 687 37 37 149 22 6 49 40 23 13 350 142
Leiria 1995 2662 8479 1702 72 38 231 751 44 32 161 28 8 78 34 43 10 393 142
Leiria 1996 3000 7986 1412 71 54 178 796 40 17 113 18 3 95 35 24 5 402 142
Leiria 1997 3143 7580 1441 79 51 183 636 42 22 107 13 3 77 30 19 9 400 207
Lisboa 1993 20882 104590 10037 1017 451 4541 3769 239 142 1502 186 61 41 31 30 11 3458 3375
Lisboa 1994 20723 123355 11162 1557 395 3873 3201 273 154 1672 120 54 60 35 35 18 4062 3595
Lisboa 1995 16525 117331 10771 994 298 3157 2851 311 146 2168 153 34 64 38 35 24 4745 4050
Lisboa 1996 17150 101607 1044 1044 188 1869 2894 348 144 1637 71 46 63 40 28 18 5356 4050
Lisboa 1997 18260 95415 10168 1067 222 1819 2888 415 118 1248 78 36 73 43 34 25 5444 4602
Portalegre  1993 625 1267 395 25 31 77 174 20 6 53 2 16 57 32 46 32 34 24
Portalegre  1994 705 1399 498 40 31 52 266 30 9 49 4 6 59 23 40 16 60 24
Portalegre  1995 705 1389 618 35 30 92 295 25 7 35 3 1 94 30 9 2 61 40
Portalegre  1996 714 1465 582 27 8 24 242 15 5 26 3 2 50 25 23 30 82 40
Portalegre  1997 797 1487 487 36 11 33 253 19 5 18 4 1 39 24 15 14 109 46
Porto  1993 8738 43504 4576 394 129 2086 2552 225 125 780 87 29 31 25 30 7 1701 1241
 32 
Porto  1994 7879 49293 4215 311 113 2381 1885 191 70 569 51 16 61 32 36 10 1844 1351
Porto  1995 8825 47440 4204 282 154 2166 1919 190 73 710 76 30 73 33 37 14 2099 1351
Porto  1996 9772 47043 4316 220 138 1169 2233 160 79 546 57 12 80 33 23 7 2428 1351
Porto  1997 10791 47209 4216 306 91 1193 2370 174 57 510 45 7 82 35 32 14 2366 1691
Santarém  1993 3348 5150 1792 76 55 203 791 43 52 165 39 13 43 25 21 6 62 31
Santarém  1994 3360 5861 1903 73 69 184 772 63 19 119 28 6 47 30 37 19 57 31
Santarém  1995 3695 5701 2161 68 60 218 818 42 29 109 16 5 52 32 54 18 87 31
Santarém  1996 3810 5625 1844 71 81 162 965 37 20 51 15 3 89 32 37 5 64 31
Santarém  1997 4049 5894 1503 35 139 862 36 24 52 10 5 85 32 35 7 62 38
Setúbal 1993 5416 14808 2367 221 154 1312 1368 107 82 295 39 15 48 29 32 22 323 168
Setúbal 1994 5285 16712 2850 177 103 1282 1518 142 42 322 33 13 65 36 28 16 379 168
Setúbal 1995 5904 17054 2663 176 135 1117 1400 149 39 332 22 6 68 35 40 9 447 168
Setúbal 1996 6322 15750 2775 140 115 763 1830 108 51 260 10 6 60 34 36 10 588 168
Setúbal 1997 6419 15627 2560 196 125 649 1609 128 38 257 38 15 102 33 30 18 622 233
V. Castelo 1993 1203 2539 895 75 15 59 173 50 38 93 16 5 15 26 27 13 88 60
V. Castelo 1994 1109 2790 811 64 19 51 209 27 19 38 11 2 54 29 23 19 140 60
V. Castelo 1995 1181 2942 1480 64 16 66 346 36 12 82 9 5 42 29 22 3 160 60
V. Castelo 1996 1304 2747 1003 49 23 47 363 25 16 26 13 1 46 53 36 3 173 60
V. Castelo 1997 1375 2595 1098 38 9 55 507 19 13 32 19 3 21 34 13 4 153 78
Vila Real  1993 1265 2515 682 51 40 88 283 32 38 67 12 3 55 28 31 7 102 98
Vila Real  1994 1264 2290 824 40 31 94 284 29 22 48 7 2 40 42 23 6 143 98
Vila Real  1995 1507 2397 1012 63 36 78 315 55 20 56 10 3 45 23 32 17 175 98
Vila Real  1996 1540 2659 840 46 34 54 296 28 22 29 4 2 80 29 45 33 193 98
Vila Real  1997 1741 2810 850 46 24 45 235 25 14 34 2 111 43 44 193 135
Viseu 1993 2025 3140 670 44 61 94 270 31 37 89 19 10 44 44 25 10 104 73
Viseu 1994 2103 3864 893 72 51 101 327 44 33 44 10 7 67 39 54 12 136 73
Viseu 1995 2388 3439 1209 60 50 80 332 40 16 65 13 47 43 41 177 73
Viseu 1996 2325 3622 1127 80 45 54 408 51 17 39 7 5 69 34 32 8 205 73
Viseu 1997 2265 3670 1144 85 24 87 361 62 23 26 8 2 59 31 16 32 199 142
 
 
Source: GEPMJ 
Notes: Convictions refers to individuals sentenced to unsuspended prison incarceration. Prison population includes individuals awaiting trial. Prison capacity refers to beds in central and regional prison facilities but 
excludes beds in three special prison facilities. *1993 prison data refers to 1992 prison data. 
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Appendix Table 8: Offenses, Arrests, Convictions, Sentence and Prison Data for Districts in Continental Portugal, 1993-97 
 
Distrito Year Offenses Arrests Convictions Imp.Sentence PrisPop* PrisCap 
Aveiro  1993 15793 1444 319 27.75 83 43 
Aveiro  1994 17366 1350 265 37.50 75 43 
Aveiro  1995 17252 1429 225 34.75 106 43 
Aveiro  1996 17033 1537 202 27.50 111 43 
Aveiro  1997 17339 1533 181 32.25 79 43 
Beja 1993 2589 679 97 25.25 72 48 
Beja 1994 2829 559 75 30.75 79 48 
Beja 1995 3003 662 59 28.50 217 166 
Beja 1996 2692 601 64 27.50 255 166 
Beja 1997 2593 495 51 22.25 256 104 
Braga 1993 16677 1596 329 26.50 247 179 
Braga 1994 17549 1387 261 33.50 247 179 
Braga 1995 18259 1424 298 32 323 179 
Braga 1996 18056 1250 242 38.50 306 179 
Braga 1997 17747 1422 239 45.75 311 120 
Bragança  1993 2802 208 43 41.25 36 59 
Bragança  1994 3290 288 43 38.50 75 59 
Bragança  1995 3516 236 56 36.50 101 59 
Bragança  1996 3331 1008 82 35.50 232 359 
Bragança  1997 3306 1157 33 48 359 364 
C.Branco  1993 3125 374 56 29 113 150 
C.Branco  1994 3235 380 64 39 139 150 
C.Branco  1995 3690 483 47 52.75 190 150 
C.Branco  1996 3421 279 42 34 317 150 
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C.Branco  1997 3687 370 59 42.50 377 223 
Coimbra 1993 10475 661 219 26.75 531 387 
Coimbra 1994 11524 648 135 37.50 511 387 
Coimbra 1995 12964 626 200 22 591 387 
Coimbra 1996 11945 540 182 30.67 631 387 
Coimbra 1997 11310 506 135 42.25 684 668 
Évora 1993 3380 479 59 41.75 52 40 
Évora 1994 3731 466 84 34.50 60 40 
Évora 1995 4029 429 95 34.25 61 40 
Évora 1996 3944 572 68 32.50 82 40 
Évora 1997 3554 514 69 35.67 109 46 
Faro 1993 18173 1595 330 34.75 296 116 
Faro 1994 19832 1798 384 36.25 333 125 
Faro 1995 19897 1919 293 35.75 377 125 
Faro 1996 21009 1999 313 34.50 477 225 
Faro 1997 21229 1880 210 30.25 490 246 
Guarda  1993 2619 312 90 49.75 80 84 
Guarda  1994 3101 329 66 41.25 147 84 
Guarda  1995 2915 296 48 51.75 194 84 
Guarda  1996 2660 340 33 37.50 175 84 
Guarda  1997 2859 403 24 44.33 205 162 
Leiria 1993 10940 963 154 28.25 286 142 
Leiria 1994 12392 1035 214 31.25 350 142 
Leiria 1995 12915 1064 229 41.25 393 142 
Leiria 1996 12469 1068 151 39.75 402 142 
Leiria 1997 12243 912 145 33.75 400 207 
Lisboa 1993 136526 9000 1891 28.25 3458 3375 
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Lisboa 1994 156797 7742 2000 37 4062 3595 
Lisboa 1995 145621 6617 2501 40.25 4745 4050 
Lisboa 1996 120845 5299 1898 37.25 5356 4050 
Lisboa 1997 124910 5344 1480 43.75 5444 4602 
Portalegre  1993 2312 302 77 41.75 34 24 
Portalegre  1994 2642 379 68 34.50 60 24 
Portalegre  1995 2747 442 46 33.75 61 40 
Portalegre  1996 2788 289 36 32 82 40 
Portalegre  1997 2807 316 28 23 109 46 
Porto  1993 57212 4992 1021 23.25 1701 1241 
Porto  1994 61698 4570 706 34.75 1844 1351 
Porto  1995 60751 4429 889 39.25 2099 1351 
Porto  1996 61351 3700 694 35.75 2428 1351 
Porto  1997 62522 3828 619 40.75 2366 1691 
Santarém  1993 10366 1092 269 23.75 62 31 
Santarém  1994 11197 1088 172 33.25 57 31 
Santarém  1995 11625 1138 159 39 87 31 
Santarém  1996 11350 1245 89 40.75 64 31 
Santarém  1997 11446 1072 91 39.75 62 38 
Setúbal 1993 22812 2941 431 32.75 323 168 
Setúbal 1994 25024 3045 410 36.25 379 168 
Setúbal 1995 25797 2801 399 38 447 168 
Setúbal 1996 24987 2816 327 35 588 168 
Setúbal 1997 24802 2511 348 45.75 622 233 
V. Castelo 1993 4712 297 152 20.25 88 60 
V. Castelo 1994 4774 306 70 31.25 140 60 
V. Castelo 1995 5667 464 108 24 160 60 
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V. Castelo 1996 5103 458 56 34.50 173 60 
V. Castelo 1997 5106 590 67 18 153 78 
Vila Real  1993 4513 443 120 30.25 102 98 
Vila Real  1994 4418 438 79 27.75 143 98 
Vila Real  1995 4979 484 89 29.25 175 98 
Vila Real  1996 5085 412 57 46.75 193 98 
Vila Real  1997 5447 329 50 66 193 135 
Viseu 1993 5879 456 155 30.75 104 73 
Viseu 1994 6932 523 94 43 136 73 
Viseu 1995 7096 502 94 43.67 177 73 
Viseu 1996 7154 558 68 35.75 205 73 
Viseu 1997 7164 534 59 34.50 199 142 
        
 
 
Source: GEPMJ 
Notes: Convictions refers to individuals sentenced to unsuspended prison incarceration. Prison population includes individuals awaiting trial. Prison capacity refers to beds in central and regional prison 
facilities but excludes beds in three special prison facilities. 
 
*1993 prison data refers to 1992 prison data. 
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Figure 1: Offenses, Arrests, Convictions, and Prison Population for Western Europe, 1995 
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Source: European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics of the Council of Europe 1999-2000. 
 
* There are no prison population figures for Greece and The Netherlands. 
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Figure 3: Offenses, Persons Charged, Convicted, and Serving Time, and Prison Data, Portugal, 1960-94 
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Source: See Table 7.4 for data; Barreto 1995 
Note: The time units on the X-axis are biannual year numbered sequentially from 1960-80; they correspond to a single year thereafter so that year 1 is 1960, year 2 is 1962, year 12 is 1981, etc. 
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Figure 4: Offenses, Persons Charged, Convicted, and Serving Time in Portugal, 
1990-94 
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Year Nº Offenses Nº Charged Nº Convicted Nº Serving Time 
 
1990 216999 56192 21833 6367 
 
1991 244901 71687 22863 4884 
 
1992 265819 82972 30351 5986 
 
1993 283860 74274 37442 7212 
 
1994 317882 95107 34484 6488 
 
Source: Barreto 1995 
Notes: Individuals charged are those brought before a criminal court. Convictions include sanctions other than 
unsuspended prison sentences. Individuals serving time include only those sentenced to prison incarceration. 
* These are pardon or “amnistia” years. 
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Figure 5: Offenses, Arrests, and Convictions in Continental Portugal, 1997 
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Offenses Arrests Convictions 
340071 237160 (7%) 3888 (16% of Arrests; 1% of Offenses) 
 
 
Source: GEPMJ 
Note: Convictions refers to individuals sentenced to unsuspended prison incarceration. 
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Figure 6: Offenses, Arrests, and Convictions for the Districts of Continental 
Portugal,  1997 
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Districts Offenses Arrests Convictions
Aveiro 17339 1533 181
Beja 2593 495 51
Braga 17747 1422 239
Bragança 3306 1157 33
Castelo Branco 3687 370 59
Coimbra 11310 506 135
Évora 3554 514 69
Faro 21229 1880 210
Guarda 2859 403 24
Leiria 12243 912 145
Lisboa 124910 5344 1480
Portalegre 2807 316 28
Porto 62522 3828 619
Santarém 11446 1072 91
Setúbal 24802 2511 348
Viana do Castelo 5106 590 67
Vila Real 5447 329 50
Viseu 7164 534 59
Source: GEPMJ 
Notes: Convictions refers to individuals sentenced  to unsuspended prison incarceration; Lisboa and Porto are excluded from the figure for greater 
resolution on the Y-axis, but the data for these two districts appear in the companion table. 
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Figure 7: Prison Population and Capacity in Continental Portugal, 1997 
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District Prison Population Prison Capacity
Aveiro 79 43
Beja 256 104
Braga 311 120
Bragança 359 364
Castelo Branco 377 223
Coimbra 684 668
Évora 109 46
Faro 490 246
Guarda 205 162
Leiria 400 207
Lisboa 5444 4602
Portalegre 109 46
Porto 2366 1691
Santarém 62 38
Setúbal 622 233
Viana do Castelo 153 78
Vila Real 193 135
Viseu 199 142
 
Source: GEPMJ 
Notes: Prison data pertain to central and regional prison facilities; 
Lisboa and Porto are excluded from the figure for greater resolution 
on the Y-axis, but the data for these two districts appear in the 
companion table. 
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Figure 8: Scatterplots of the Probability of Arrest, Probability of Conviction, and 
Average Imposed Sentence Length for Total Crimes in Portugal, 1997 
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AverSentLength = 32.877 + 40.304 ProbConviction     R2= .049 Se= 11.292 N=18 
              (6.550)  (44.206) 
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i The time units on the X-axis are biannual years numbered sequentially from 1960-1980 and annually 
thereafter so that year 1 is 1960, year 2 is 1962, year 12 is 1981, … and year 25 is 1994. 
ii In Portugal, both the national and regional legislative assemblies and the executive body (the 
Government) have the authority to legislate. 
